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Abstract
The Internet, as a network of networks, routes traffic by relaying the data from
one network to another, thus enabling the owner of those networks to observe the
contained information or relay it to intelligence agencies. In this thesis, we evaluate the
program Traceroute as a means to identify individual steps in a connection. We present
a tool chain to correlate Traceroute detected paths with paths derived from the Border
Gateway Protocol and show a strong correlation between them. Additionally, we present
multiple reasons why mismatches between Traceroute paths and the Border Gateway
Protocol paths have to be expected and categorize our observations accordingly. We
conclude by arguing that Traceroute is a valid path detection tool.
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1 Introduction
We are under surveillance. Even though there have been reports about intelligence agencies
monitoring Internet communication [13, 28], the revelations of 2013 by Edward Snowden
showed a whole new scale of global surveillance [19]. The revelations showed that intel-
ligence agencies, first and foremost the NSA, are trying to gain complete access to any
communication in the Internet. There are new articles on a regular basis that reveal new
information about the surveillance efforts and how our everyday Internet traffic is observed.
The Internet is a collaboration of thousands of different, smaller networks called au-
tonomous systems (ASes, sg. AS). ASes by themselves are composed of interconnected
machines that are assigned IPs from a set of IPs (called prefixes) exclusively owned by the
AS owner. Every AS is connected to their neighboring ASes, called peers. For communi-
cation in the Internet, a chain between such peers is used, where each AS relays received
traffic one step further to the target AS that contains the target machine.
Since any traffic going to or leaving an AS is relayed through its machines, an owner of
an involved AS has, as a consequence, a certain degree of access to the transmitted data.
Even if the traffic is encrypted, meta data, such as the connection duration, data volume,
and involved parties can still be observed. Meta data can reveal the type and content of a
connection, hence it is highly sensitive, as for example the news sites that a person visits can
reveal his or her political and social opinions. Thus, we are interested in understanding to
whom our meta data is leaked. The present thesis focusses on the aspect of understanding
to whom meta data is leaked1.
To gain information about involved parties in a connection we need to find out the
connection path on the AS level. The involved ASes can then easily be translated to real
life entities, as AS ownership is public knowledge. There are three possible approaches we
can attempt: we can ask the ISP, use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), or use a program
called Traceroute.
Asking the ISP. The first approach is to ask the AS owner where the traffic is routed
to, and then query all subsequent AS owners on a per connection basis. This approach is
obviously unfeasible, as carriers do not provide tools for such requests to be answered in a
timely manner. Furthermore, this information is usually considered a business secret.
BGP. BGP connects ASes with each other and represents today’s main approach of ex-
changing reachability and routing information in-between ASes. BGP allows ASes to notify
their peers about which connections they provide by exchanging messages. Multiple BGP
messages for the same routing information can be received by a peer. However, the peer
only selects one message that it incorporates in its own set of routing information. This
1Research showed, that anonymization networks such as Tor also need to be aware of path participants
as a network attacker can deanonimize Tor users in certain cases [14].
1
set is then advertised to the peers of the AS. When further advertising a received routing
information the AS that previously received the message, appends its own number onto a
already contained list of previous steps, thus a BGP message also contains the propagation
path. Therefore, it is possible to derive the path of the traffic based on BGP communication
data.
The expected usage of BGP is that ASes only advertise routing information they intend
to adhere. However, ASes can lie about routing information, and advertise connections they
do not intend to provide. This has happened in the past, e.g., as a means for censoring [12].
Therefore, the soundness of a given BGP message is not guaranteed. Furthermore, pub-
licly available BGP data is sparse and only covers a small part of the Internet [10, 11, 16].
Consequently, BGP appears to be a suboptimal solution to make inferences about a com-
munication path.
Traceroute. Traceroute is a tool designed to discover the machines participating in a
connection. Traceroute can be run from any machine and exploits aspects of the Internet
Protocol (IP). It is designed to get replies from every server participating in a connection,
thus revealing their IP-address in the response. The resulting list of IP-addresses can then
be mapped onto autonomous system numbers (ASNs). This list then results in the AS
path. This approach has problems of its own problems as IP-address to ASN mapping is
not necessarily reliable and border routers are known to share IP-addresses between peering
ASes as Mao et al. have shown [22].
Furthermore, the question arises, whether the Traceroute path discovered reflects the
actual path the connection takes. Paths may change rapidly due to load balancing or be
incomplete as not every machine participating in the relay has to respond to traceroute
probes.
Contribution. In this thesis we address the question whether Traceroute can be con-
sidered reliable for path detection by performing Traceroute measurements from within
different ASes to a multitude of targets. We correlate the findings with the corresponding
BGP data advertised by the start ASes using the Routeviews projects and RIPE-Ris. To
achieve this we implement a tool chain that automates the needed processes. We show a
strong correlation between the two data sets as well as the relatively steadiness of the AS
paths discovered by either method. Additionally we propose Route Fluttering,Short Lived
Routing Problems, and Transit ASes as reasons why Traceroute detected paths cannot al-
ways be a perfect match with BGP advertised paths and categorize observed patterns by
those reasons. Based on our findings we argue that Traceroute is as a valid path discovery
tool.
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2 Related Work
There is a multitude of work covering the topic of routing, structure of the Internet and
reliability of traceroute or BGP on inferring the observable Internet structure. Furthermore,
there is already previous work on the correlation between traceroute and BGP. This chapter
covers first work concerning the structure of the Internet and second work relating to the
reliability of BGP and traceroute.
Gao published the first of a chain of papers concerning the relationships and connectivity
between autonomous systems in the Internet. Gao classifies AS relationships into different
categories and presents a solution to infer them from BGP data. Gao uses internal AT&T
data and the public the WHOIS service to verify the results [17]. Even though the paper
gives insight into the theory of routing policies and relationships between different ASes, it
does not approach the topic of package routing predictions, which is the main topic of this
thesis. The results of this paper argue strongly toward logical and predictable connectivity
and therefore predictable routing paths.
Dimitropoulos et al. build upon the idea of Gao and introduces a heuristics for inferring
AS relationships. The authors perform a survey to validate their results. They further
compare their results with BGP information and show that BGP does miss a significant
quantity of up to 86.2% of true adjacencies [15]. This significantly points out the limitations
of BGP in inferring the structure of the Internet on the AS level and the need for a tool
that is not based on voluntary public information and company policies.
Anonymous researchers discovered large parts of the Internet Topology in the Internet
Census 2012. They infiltrated a large amount of weakly secured embedded devices and
ran multiple scans, including Traceroute. The researchers were able to obtain 68 million
traceroute records. It is noteworthy though that the means of this discovery approach were
unethical and thus the results are not usable for scientific purposes. However, the Internet
Census showed that a vast amount of the Internet can be scanned if enough different probe
placements can be obtained [1].
Ricardo Oliveira et al. measure how much and how precise the current Internet struc-
ture on the AS-level is actually revealed. They establish a ground truth of connectivity
and compare it with the inferred topology maps to establish empirical facts about the reli-
ability. As the work is concerned with AS-topology and connectivity, it does not focus on
actual routing paths through those networks but shows that BGP data is unreliable for non
carrier connections and therefore another approach to gain information about routing and
connectivity has to be established [23].
A. Faggiani et al. discuss the potential of traceroute based data in revealing Internet
topology information in addition to BGP data. Faggiani et al. point out that the BGP
infrastructure alone is only able to cover up to 15.9% of the Internet core. They further show
evidence that using traceroute would give a significant improvement on Internet topology
and connectivity insight [16]
Zhang et Al. point out problems using traceroute and mapping its result onto ASNs to
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get ASN paths. The authors show that mapping IP-addresses on ASNs by longest prefix
matching is error prone and may yield wrong results in a significant amount of cases. They
further propose and present a solution to counter this effect [32]. We consider the presented
problems and will address whether they still manifest in current measurements.
Mao et al. address problems of mapping traceroute hops onto AS numbers. The authors
present results showing that BGP and traceroute data differ in AS level routes due to
Internet Exchange Points, other traceroute detectable anomalies, and an incomplete IP-
address to ASN mapping [22]. As this thesis covers the same area of research, we consider
the presented problems and discuss their impact on our measurements.
4
3 Background
In this chapter we explain the necessary background to understand the tool chain that
gathers information on the correlation between Traceroute and BGP derived AS paths.
The inner workings of the tool chain are described in Chapter 5. This chapter explains
BGP in general terms and throughly explains those parts that are utilized by our tool
chain. Furthermore, we describe the needed aspects of MRT, which is a format for storing
BGP data with its context information. We conclude the chapter by an explanation of the
program Traceroute which is also utilized by our tool chain.
3.1 BGP
Routing information is needed by everybody participating in routing a package. A pack-
age is routed by continuously forwarding a package until the package reaches its assigned
destination. The routing information contain the information for the next step.
BGP is todays main tool for the advertisement of routing information between peering
ASes. BGP enables peering ASes to advertise routing information on what IPs they con-
nect to, to their peers. The IPs are encoded in consecutive blocks called prefixes. BGP
information is send in messages that are exchanged by peers. There are multiple different
types of messages which are used by the BGP protocol. We only focus on BGP update
messages as the other message types do not contain useful information for us.
3.1.1 BGP Update Messages
BGP messages are in binary format and follow a structure specified in RFC4271, extended
in RFC4893 to account for bigger ASN numbers, and by RFC4760 to account for different
Network Layer protocols (e.g. IPv6) [6,25,29]. Each BGP message is preceded by a header
containing a marker, the length of the message, and the type of the message.
A BGP update message consists of 5 fields of varying length: Withdrawn Routes Length,
Withdrawn Routes, Total Path Attribute Length, Path Attributes, Network Layer Reachabil-
ity Information (NLRI). The Withdrawn Routes Length and Total Path Attribute Length
field determine how big the Withdrawn Routes and Path Attributes fields are respectively.
The length of the NLRI field is determined by the overall length of the message minus the
already used length [6, 29].
An IP-Prefix (short: prefix) determines a block of IPs. A prefix is specified by an IP-
address and the first n significant bits. Any IP-address whose first n bits are identical to
the n significant bits of a prefix belongs to the block of IPs defined by that prefix.
A BGP update message advertises new routes in form of prefixes. A BGP update
message advertises at most one new route related to multiple prefixes that share the same
Path Attributes. The prefixes of an advertised route are either contained in the NLRI field
of the message or in the MP REACH NLRI path attribute. Each BGP update message has
to contain a single AS PATH attribute. The AS PATH attribute identifies the autonomous
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systems the BGP update message has passed through [6,29]. Only the ’best’ route is selected
for re-advertisement to the peers. A router selects the ’best’ route by using different policies
which are specified by the administrator.
Routes can be merged. This is done if a router has routes with overlapping prefixes (e.g.
10.0.0.0/30 and 10.0.0.4/30 ). In such case both update messages are merged into one that
contains the new prefix (10.0.0.8/30 ). The AS PATH attribute is also merged and now
consists of a list that only contains the ASN the merging router belongs to. The list is
followed by a set that contains all ASNs of both AS PATH attributes of the old routes in
no specific order.
A BGP update message contains multiple withdrawn routes represented by their re-
spective prefix. The prefixes are either listed in the Withdrawn Routes field or in the
MP UNREACH NLRI path attribute [6, 29].
3.1.2 MRT
The Multi-Threaded Routing Toolkit Routing Information Export Format (MRT) describes
a format to export routing information. Thus it provides the means to collect BGP routing
information from different routers and save them with their context information for later
processing [21]. The relevant MRT types used in the later on described tool chain are
TABLE DUMP V2 and BGP4MP.
TABLE DUMP V2. A BGP Routing Information Base (RIB) stores all route updates
received by a router and thus contains all current routes known to the router. The TA-
BLE DUMP V2 MRT type is used to save complete RIB dumps of each peer of the collec-
tor. Rib dumps typically solely contain this data type.
A TABLE DUMP V2 is always started by a PEER INDEX TABLE. A
PEER INDEX TABLE contains the list of peers of a BGP collector. The
PEER INDEX TABLE is followed by the actual RIB of the peers. A RIB Entry
sequence is preceded by a header that defines the prefix the RIB Entries are related to and
the amount of RIB Entries that follow.
A RIB Entry consists of the Peer Index, Originated Time, Attribute Length, BGP
Attributes fields. The Peer Index references the peer that sent the data, in the
PEER INDEX TABLE. The Originated Time contains the time the contained informa-
tion was received. The Attribute Length determines the length of the BGP Attributes field.
The BGP Attributes field contains the PATH ATTRIBUTES of the BGP update message
relevant for the advertised prefix received by the respective peer [21].
BGP4MP MESSAGE. The BGP4MP MESSAGE precedes a BGP message received
by the peer and is used to store context information. The BGP4MP MESSAGE contains
among other fields the Peer AS Number, and the BGP Message.
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The Peer AS Number field specifies the AS Number of the peer that sent the contained
BGP Message. The BGP Message field contains the complete BGP message as sent by the
peer [21].
A dump usually consists of multiple of such MRT entries and encompasses a certain
timeframe chosen by the collector. All BGP messages received by the peers in that time-
frame are dumped into the same file using this MRT type.
3.2 Traceroute
Traceroute is a program used to detect participating server in a routing relay. It exploits
features of IP to gain responses from participating servers containing their IP-address.
Traceroute uses the time to live (ttl) of IP packages to trigger a response from each
participating server in a connection. A ttl denotes the remaining lifetime of a package in
terms of steps. This lifetime ensures that even if the package can never reach its destination,
it will not be relayed through the Internet for forever. Each time a package is forwarded
to another server the ttl is decreased by one [7]. As soon as a package with a ttl of zero
reaches a server the server notifies the sender of the decay of the package using ICMP [8].
Traceroute starts its detection by sending a package to the target with a ttl of one and
then incrementally increases the ttl for the next packages until either the target host is
reached or an upper limit of steps is achieved. In theory each participating server will get a
package with a ttl equal to zero and respond with an ICMP TIME EXCEEDED message,
which will contain its IP-address. In practice not every server has ICMP messages enabled
and thus Traceroute does not necessarily detect every server in a connection. Additionally
it is possible to circumvent Traceroute detection by not decrementing the ttl or branching
off the traffic with physical means, such as copying the traffic passed through a cable. Both
methods ensure that it is impossible for Traceroute to detect that additional parties are
involved in a connection. This is different to not sending an ICMP TIME EXCEEDED
message as there the missing step is recognized.
3.3 IXP
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are providers of physical infrastructure to interconnect a
large amount of ASes with each other. ASes choose those connections, if available, in favor
of direct connections with their peers, as an IXP can be cheaper and faster [18] [20]. Bigger
IXPs even provide international data transfer capabilities and thus enable ASes to exchange
traffic with a geographical distant AS faster and more reliable than typical connection chain
as less parties are involved [27].
Traffic routed via an IXP traverses the routers of the IXP and is thus reflected in
Traceroute. However, BGP sessions can be established between the peers connected via
the IXP only. Such a connection is called bilateral [26]. This leaves the IXP out of the
connection and leads to the BGP path not reflecting the participation of the IXP in traffic
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Figure 1: physical AS connection via IXP vs. AS BGP peering
routing (Fig. 1). Such a configuration should reflect in the Traceroute AS path as one
additional ASN appearing in between sections of the AS path predicted by BGP.
To the best of our knowledge there is no public list of IXP ASNs, and therefore it is
not possible to reliably determine the mismatches caused by IXPs. Mao et al. propose a
heuristic detection algorithm to determine possible IXPs in a traceroute path [22]. Owed to
the limited scope and width of our measurements, usage of the algorithm is not feasible. The
algorithm requires multiple different vantage points to ensure low false positive detections.
As we only use two different vantage points with low overall target amount, IXPs would not
be reliably detectable. We still list IXPs as a potential reason for mismatches for overall
completeness, but studying their influence is out of the scope of the thesis.
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4 Expected Patterns of Mismatches
BGP contained paths should, in theory, show the same routing path detected by Traceroute.
However, we argue that we have to expect differences due to the distinction between the
exchange of routing information via BGP and the actual physical connection and traffic
routing between two peering AS. Therefore, we expect to observe certain patterns in both
Traceroute and BGP derived paths. In this chapter we point out three reasons why such
differences have to occur. However, we still expect the majority of paths to match and that
a high correlation between BGP and Traceroute exists. The intention of this chapter is to
explain why a perfect match is not likely and thus Traceroute might be the better choice
to detect machine specific routing behavior.
4.1 Route Fluttering
Load balancing is used to distribute the load of handling traffic and connections over dif-
ferent servers. This ensures that each server is able to handle its appointed load. An AS
is a network like the Internet, only in a smaller scale. Therefore, choosing different routes
potentially sends the traffic to different border routers (Fig. 2). Border routers connect the
AS to its peers and different border routers commonly have different peers and therefore
different BGP sessions. As a result, the traffic goes different routes if passed through dif-
ferent border routers, resulting in different Traceroute paths in different measurements at
different points in time.
We expect this to show in a distinct pattern of differences between the BGP and Tracer-
oute detected paths. We expect that the Traceroute path changes rapidly between two main
routes whereas the BGP path remains constant for the same time period. We expect this
pattern, as only one border router typically peers with the collector and load balancing po-
tentially leads the traffic to different routers. This necessarily leads to a mismatch if the non
peering router with a different routing table forwards the package at one measurement and
the peering router at another measurement. Such fluttering routes were already theorized
and detected as early as 1996 by Paxson [24].
For further analysis, we define a fluttering route as a route which switches multiple
times between a matching AS path and a non-matching AS path. As a threshold we chose
3 for-and-back changes as we only want to detect the routes that are clearly fluttering.
Routes which are frequently changing its Traceroute derived AS path between paths not
matching BGP predicted paths will not be counted. We argue that fluttering cannot be
the sole explanation for those mismatches and thus should not be used as the reason. It is
likely, that fluttering partially explains those patterns but there have to be other reasons
to account for as well. We also do not count paths which present some changes similiar
to fluttering, but with a count lower than the threshold. Such occurrences are more likely
be explained by a short timed routing problem in the connection leading to using a detour
instead of the main route, thus no connection to load balancing.
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Figure 2: Visualization of different routing paths due to AS internal load balancing
leading to different border routers
4.2 Short Lived Routing Problems
Routers are based on software that runs on hardware, both representing possible points of
failures. Additionally, updates and upgrades have to be installed at some point. Either
option leads to a time limited shutdown of the router and thus the router is not reachable.
As border routers are routers they eventually experience such a shutdown and are thus
unable to be reached by their peers. In such a case a peer will have to account for the
change and change its routing behavior by choosing another next step, possibly residing in
another AS. This will lead to the Traceroute suddenly detecting a new route. BGP only
reflects the new route if the update message that contains the new path has already been
propagated to the collector or the downtime did not occur in-between two measurements
and the old route was already reinstated. We also speculate that a BGP router does not
immediately advertises a change due to non-reachability to its peer but waits to determine
if the change is long-term.
We argue that such occurrences should be reflected in measurements by Traceroute
detecting a different path than BGP which is only short lived and does not occur regulary
and thus should be attributed to route fluttering. For categorization we define any route
exhibiting a change in Traceroute but not in BGP as short lived routing problems iff
• the mismatch lasts for less than 4 measurement and
• the frequency for the new route is not higher than the threshold for route fluttering
10
4.3 Transit AS
A transit AS is an intermediate AS between peers that transits the traffic in-between. Usage
of transit ASes is is not restricted to different peers. A transit AS can be used if at some
location in the AS it is faster to route the traffic through an other AS than using the internal
infrastructure. A likely scenario for such an occurrence is a spread of an AS over a vast
geographical area, e.g. a split of an AS between two different continents.
Such a split can either be bridged by using IXP infrastructure connecting the two parts
of the AS or by using an intermediate AS which simply forwards the traffic from one location
to another. If such a forwarding is achieved by configuration of the routing tables in the
participating border routers and thus left out of BGP configuration, it will lead to an
additional ASN in the Traceroute path but not in the BGP path. This is due to the fact
that external configurations are not reflected in the outgoing BGP table.
Even if a transit AS is included into the BGP configuration, it is not necessarily reflected
in the corresponding Traceroute path. As such an transit AS is used to overcome an area
limited efficiency problem it is possible that the border router peering with a collector
advertises such solution whereas the border router used by Traceroute does not. This
situation would also result in a mismatch.
Both presented characteristics of transit ASes can lead to mismatches. A transit AS
connecting the same AS can show in both BGP and Traceroute with a distinct pattern (e.g.
{A,B,A}) whereas B is the transit AS). A transit AS connecting two different peers would
either be reflected in BGP and thus be no different than any other regular hop or only be
reflected in Traceroute if this connection is established by other means than BGP. Such a
mismatch would look similar to an IXP but be restricted to very few if not only one distinct
AS as the utility of such a setup would be restricted to quite specific circumstances.
We already explained in Chapter 3.3 the problems of detecting IXPs. As we cannot
detect IXPs reliable we cannot distinguish between a transit AS, achieved by other means
than BGP, and an IXP. Thus we will only focus on transit ASes used for connections in the
same AS.
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5 Experimental Setup
In this chapter we describe the experimental setup. We start by explaining the tool chain
and conclude the chapter by explaining the data points used to gather the data.
Figure 3: BGP analysis first step
5.1 Tool Chain
The tool chain consists of three tools. The Mrtreader and Tracestat are used to gather BGP
and Traceroute information respectively. The Analyzer is used to analyze the gathered data
and calculate the relevant data points we are are interested in.
We will address the tools on an abstract level to convey the overall theoretical notion of
the underlying implementation. We implemented the described tools using Common-LISP
and uploaded the programs to github (https://github.com/simkoc/toolchain).
5.1.1 Mrtreader
The Mrtreader is used to download and parse BGP/MRT data as well as to analyze the
retrieved information. Information about the relevant parts of BGP and MRT can be read
in Chapter 3.
Download and parsing. To establish a starting point to which future BGP UPDATE
messages are applied, a dump containing a TABLE DUMP V2 that is provided by a col-
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Figure 4: BGP analysis second step
lector peering with an AS of interest, is downloaded and parsed. The creation date of the
dump is the start date of the analyzes. The Mrtreader extracts the information about
the contained prefixes, their receiving time, and the corresponding AS PATHs and inserts
them into a database. Each peer contained in the PEER INDEX TABLE is assinged its
own database. After this step each peer of the collector, who created the dump, has its own
database containing all known routes at the time of the dump creation.
Following the processing of the TABLE DUMP V2 all BGP4MP containing files pro-
vided by the collector which were created within the timespan between the TABLE DUMP V2
and the end of the analyzing period are downloaded. The Mrtreader processes the files con-
secutively and inserts the information into the respective databases (Fig. 3). Every newly
advertised route of a peer is entered into the respective database with its advertisement
time. Any withdrawn route is updated with the time of the withdrawal.
Extraction of relevant data. The second functionality of the Mrtreader is to create
a list containing the used AS PATHs to a certain target at a certain time from a certain
peer. To gather that information we create a routing table. The Mrtreader extracts all
prefixes that are advertised but not withdrawn up until the relevant point in time from
the database of the respective peer and inserts them into a search tree supporting longest
prefix matching. Subsequently the Mrtreader queries the routing table for the relevant IPs
and retrieves the corresponding AS PATH. The result is then append to a file respective to
the queried IP and peer ASN. Each line in the file contains the relevant point in time, the
target IP, a hash of the AS PATH and the AS PATH (Fig. 4).
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Figure 5: Traceroute
As querying the database and creating the routing table takes a considerable amount of
cpu cycles, each datapoint in the file is 60 minutes apart.
5.1.2 Tracestat
Tracestat is used to gather Traceroute paths and translates them into AS paths. Information
on Traceroute can be found in Chapter 3. Tracestat is split into two parts. The first part
calls Traceroutes placed at different locations. The second part translates and dumps the
retrieved information.
First part. The first part calls provided Traceroutes by using predefined interfaces in-
cluded into Tracestat. It is possible to integrate multiple different Traceroutes into Traces-
tat and thus enables Tracestat to collect Traceroute paths from multiple different locations.
Each Tracestat interface can be called with a single IP and returns a list of IPs repre-
senting the path detected by Traceroute. It is possible, that Traceroute returns multiple
IP-addresses for the same step, as more than one probe package for each step is sent. In
such case Tracestat uses the first IP-addresses of each step.
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Figure 6: Correlating BGP and Traceroute for a single IP-address
Second part. WHOIS is designed to request information about an IP including the cor-
responding prefix as well as the owner ASN [5]. Tracestat maps an IP onto an ASN using a
server speaking the WHOIS protocol. We chose the WHOIS server hosted by Team Cymru
as it provides the information as comma seperated values and is thus easy to parse [2].
Tracestat further reduces the resulting ASN paths. It deletes consecutive duplicates of
ASNs as well as WHOIS results of IPs the WHOIS service was not able to identify, ref-
erenced as NIL (e.g. (123,234,NIL,234,345) becomes (123,234,345)). This process leaves
paths which are easy to compare as they contain the minimum of relevant data needed.
Finally Tracestat dumps the resulting ASN path with its context information into an target
IP related file stored in a Traceroute location related folder. Each line of a file contains
the timestamp of the corresponding measurement, the target IP, the IP path,the translated
ASN path, and the hashes of the paths.
Figure 5 gives a graphical overview of the setup for gathering Traceroute information
from multiple different Traceroute locations.
5.1.3 Analyzer
The Analyzer uses the files generated by the Mrtreader and Tracestat to calculate the
different intended values. The Analyzer starts by parsing in the previously generated files
and makes them accessible for the subsequently described processes. The Analyzer drops
any Traceroute measurement which final step did not reach the intended target AS. The
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Figure 7: Correlating BGP and Traceroute
Analyzer resolves the expected ASN of the target IP by relying on prefix to ASN mappings
provided by the CAIDA [9]. The mapping is provided as a separate file and we suggest
using the mapping located in the middle of the timeframe of a measurement.
The main focus of the Analyzer lies on the correlation between the AS level paths
obtained by Traceroute and BGP analysis. The Analyzer also calculates the proportion of
changes in either Traceroute or BGP paths subsequently also reflected in the sibling data
set. As a last bit of information the Analyzer calculates the average time a route stays stable
and the influence of length on the possibility of sudden change. Each aspect is addressed
separately.
(Strong/Weak) correlation. The Analyzer obtains the correlation between Traceroute
and BGP by pairing each measurement of the two respected data sets of the same IP with
its closest sibling measurement. Subsequently the Analyzer calculates the proportion of
matched and unmatched ASN paths. This process is applied to all obtained data sets and
averaged over all results (Fig. 6). For the weak correlation the Analyzer relaxes the exact
match restriction by counting the amount of ASNs appearing in both paths in the same
order. The Analyzer skips non matching ASNs by performing a look ahead in the path of
the sibling to decide whether a given ASN will later on appear in the sibling path or is an
additional step not reflected by the measurement.
Change Reflection. To obtain information on how well and fast a change of route in
one dataset is reflected in the sibling dataset the Analyzer reduces the data sets to changes
only. It only keeps the first data point after a change in an ASN path for further analysis.
Consecutively, the Analyzer pairs the measurement points of the sets for the same IP with
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Figure 8: formular to calculate correlation coefficient
some restrictions. The Analyzer only pairs two points iff
• the measurement point is chronological after the one to pair with
• the AS paths are the same
Following this the quota of paired and non-paired data points is calculated as well as the
average time difference between the matched pairs (Fig. 7). Again the Analyzer subjects
all data sets to this process and averages the results over all data sets.
Average Time To Change. The Analyzer calculates the average time it takes before a
route changes by reducing the datasets to only reflect the changes that occurred during the
measurements. This process is similar to the first step in calculating the change reflection.
Subsequently the Analyzer calculates and averages the time difference between two changes.
This process is applied to all data sets of the same measurement type and averaged over all
results.
Influence of length on change. The Analyzer measures the influence of length on the
probability of change by calculating the correlation coefficient between the length of the AS
path and the amount of changes in the measurement time frame. The Analyzers traverses
all datasets and produces a tuple (x, y) whereas x denotes the average length of the AS path
of the dataset and y denotes how many changes happened during the measurement time
frame. The Analyzer uses the resulting list of tuples to calculate the correlation coefficient
(Fig. 8).
5.2 Data Gathering
In this chapter we explain what measurement points and BGP collectors where used for
the Mrtreader and Tracestat. An in-depth quality analysis of the used data was out of the
scope of this thesis.
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5.2.1 MRTreader
We found two projects which collect and provide BGP data: the routeviews project and
the Re´seaux IP Europe´ens Routing Information Service (RIPE-RIS). The provided BGP
data is contained in MRT data dumps (either TABLE DUMP V2 or BGP4MP) that are
dumped in different time intervals.
Routeviews project. The routeviews project provides access to 13 collectors that have
AS as peers who are providing regular BGP updates. It is hosted and maintained by the
University of Oregon. The BGP data is available from as early as October 2001 and can be
downloaded in 15 minute update dump blocks or 2 hour separated full dumps [11].
RIPE-RIS. RIPE-RIS is the second organization and has 13 running collectors spread
across the world with substantially different peers. RIPE-RIS provides the data in 5 minute
update chunks and 8 hour separated full dumps. Data is available from as early as 2001 [10].
5.2.2 Tracestat
As Tracestat is able to interface with Traceroutes at different locations we had to select ASes
which contained an accessible server running Traceroute as well as provided public BGP
information. As the University of Saarland is part of the Deutsches Forschungs Netzwerk
(DFN) that is a peer with a BGP collector, we chose to station one probe on a university
server.
For the second probe we searched through the server list of Looking Glass. Looking
Glass is a collaboration of different servers providing an online (HTTP) interface to run
Traceroute probes from their location and retrieve the information [3]. We chose AS12306
as the other location based on the usability of the interface as well as on the amount of
published prefixes. AS12306 belongs to plusline which is a professional hosting service.
The Traceroute interface is hosted by the renown German IT-newspaper publisher Heise
(http://www.heise.de/netze/tools/Traceroute/). Table 1 lists all available Traceroute probe
locations that are in an AS that peers with a collector of either the Routeviews project or
RIPE-RIS.
For AS680 we obtained the relevant IPs by downloading the Tor consensus from 13-04-
2015. Consecutively we diversified the contained IP-addresses by removing all but one IP
having the same first two bytes. With this line of action we ensured that an IP-address will
be reachable for Traceroute without having to search the prefix ranges of any given ASN
and also secured that multiple different ASes will be targeted. We selected an overall of 200
different IPs for probing.
For AS12306 the possible IPs to probe were more limited due to the limited amount of
published prefixes. We extracted all prefixes from the BGP records and probed the first five
IPs of each prefix for available servers. We gathered 14 usable IPs for measurements starting
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ASN peer usable interface published prefixes
AS680 RIPE-RIS yes 533926
AS22548 RIPE-RIS no 540768
AS12306 RIPE-RIS yes 70
AS33843 RIPE-RIS no 35
AS2914 RIPE-RIS no 530662
AS10848 RIPE-RIS yes 7
AS8816 RIPE-RIS yes 10
Table 1: table showing ASN,peering project,usability of the interface, and the amount of
prefixes published
24-05-2015 and an overall of 24 different IPs for measurements starting at 02-05-2015. We
were not able to utilize all 70 published prefixes as some were duplicates and other did not
contain a responsive server in the first 5 IPs.
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6 Results
In this chapter we describe the measurement results of both measurement periods and give
a description of the obtained results. The first measurement period spanned from the 25th
to the 30th of April. The second measurement period spanned from the 2nd of Mai to the
16th of Mai. A short overview of the results can be obtained at Table 2. We conclude
this segment by comparing the two measurement points and explaining why the observed
differences occurred.
AS680 (25th till 30th) AS12360 (25th till 30th)
amount used probe targets 175 14
strong correlation 85.65% 92.62%
BGP Data
BGP =⇒ Traceroute 42.86% (no BGP changes)
avg. time to change 5.4h (no BGP changes)
Traceroute Data
weak correlation 95.72% 96.41%
Traceroute =⇒ BGP 22.32% 25%
avg. time to change 6.08h 3h
corr. coeff. (IP) 0.43 0.60
corr. coeff. (ASN) 0.17 0.81
AS680 (2nd till 16th) AS12360 (02nd till 16th)
amount used probe targets 177 22
strong correlation 85.77% 90%
BGP Data
BGP =⇒ Traceroute 71.43% 0%
avg. time to change 14.84 65h
Traceroute Data
weak correlation 96.12% 93%
Traceroute =⇒ BGP 20.35% 0%
avg. time to change 8.8h -
corr. coeff. (IP) 0.46 0.31
corr. coeff. (ASN) 0.28 0.29
Table 2: Raw results of the data analysis for the two AS. Amount used probes relates to the
amount of IP-addresses finally used for evaluation. =⇒ abbreviates the influence of change
in the left data type onto the right one. (IP) and (ASN) stand for IP-path and ASN-path
respectively
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6.1 AS680
First measurement period. We chose a total of 200 different target IPs of which 175
were usable in the end. 25 proved to be completely unusable as the Traceroute probes never
reached the destination and therefore rendered a proper analysis impossible.
In 13 targets we encountered an infrequent mismatch between BGP and Traceroute
path. In those cases BGP and Traceroute differentiated at most in 2 measurements and
disagreed on one step in the path. We counted 6 targets where BGP consistently added
an additional AS and 10 targets in which Traceroute added consistently at least 1 ASN in
contrast to BGP. In 5 targets BGP added an additional ASN in at most 5 measurements. A
remainder of 4 targets showed additional deviation which did not fit the previously described
patterns. A total of 44 targets showed some deviation during the measurement period. The
gathered data showed both a high strong and high weak correlation. The strong correlation
is at 86% whereas the weak correlation is 96%.
43% of all BGP changes were at some later point reflected in the Traceroute data. 22%
of Traceroute changes were reflected in the BGP data at a later measurement. The time
between the reflection of a BGP change in the Traceroute data was an average of 0.5h.
Traceroute changes were reflected in BGP after an average of 1.12h.
The correlation coefficient of the influence of length on the change quota of the Tracer-
oute data was 0.43 for IP based paths and 0.17 for ASN based paths. If a target experienced
changes during our measurements it occurred on average after 5.4h for BGP derived paths
and after 6h for Traceroute detected paths.
Second measurement period. We chose the same 200 different target IPs of which 177
were usable in the end. 23 proved to be completely unusable as the Traceroute probes never
reached the destination and therefore rendered a proper analysis impossible.
In 15 targets we encountered an infrequent mismatch between BGP and Traceroute
path. In those cases BGP and Traceroute differentiated at most in 5 measurements and
disagreed on one step in the path. We counted 6 targets where BGP consistently added an
additional AS and 11 targets in which Traceroute added consistently, in contrast to BGP,
at least 1 ASN and in one case even 2. In 7 targets BGP added an additional ASN in at
most 5 measurements. A remainder of 5 targets showed additional deviation which did not
fit the previously described patterns. A total of 48 targets showed some deviation during
the measurement period. The gathered data showed both a high strong and high weak
correlation. The strong correlation is at 86% whereas the weak correlation is 96%.
71% of all BGP changes were at some later point reflected in the Traceroute data. 20%
of Traceroute changes were reflected in the BGP data at a later measurement. The time
between the reflection of a BGP change in the Traceroute data was an average of 0.5h.
Traceroute changes were reflected in BGP after an average of 0.5h.
The correlation coefficient of the influence of length on the change quota of the Tracer-
oute data was 0.46 for IP based paths and 0.28 for ASN based paths. If a target experienced
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changes during our measurements it occurred on average after 14.44h for BGP derived paths
and after 8.89h for Traceroute detected paths.
6.2 AS12306
First measurement period. We chose 14 different target IPs based on the published
prefixes of the AS. All results were usable at the end of the measurement period.
We counted only 1 target which did not match Traceroute and BGP paths. During the
whole measurement period there it mismatched. Traceroute added one step when compared
to the BGP path. Every other target had exactly the same matching BGP and Traceroute
predicted paths during the whole measurement period. This resulted in both a high strong
and high weak correlation. Strong correlation was at 93% and weak correlation was at 96%.
We observed no BGP changes. The correlation coefficient of the influence of path length
on the change quota of the Traceroute data was 0.60 for IP based paths and 0.81 for ASN
based paths. If a target experienced changes during our measurements it occurred on
average within 2 hours.
Second measurement period. We chose 24 different target IPs based on the published
prefixes of the AS. 22 were usable at the end of the measurement period.
We counted only 3 target which did not match Traceroute and BGP paths. During the
whole measurement period they mismatched. Traceroute added one step when compared to
the BGP path. Two of those three targets had an additional step discovered by Traceroute
in at least 50 measurement points. Every other target had exactly the same matching BGP
and Traceroute predicted paths during the whole measurement period. This resulted in
both a high strong and high weak correlation. Strong correlation was at 90% and weak
correlation was at 93%.
The correlation coefficient of the influence of path length on the change quota of the
Traceroute data was 0.31 for IP based paths and 0.29 for ASN based paths. If a target
experienced changes during our measurements it occurred on average within 65 hours for
BGP.
6.3 Comparing Both Measurement Points
In this section we go into details about the differences observed between AS680, AS12306,
and between the measurement periods. We will explain why we think those differences
occurred and conclude by categorizing AS12306 as a sanity check for the AS680 values for
the weak and strong correlation.
Strong and weak correlation. Both datasets yielded quite equal results for the strong
and weak correlation correlation. As explained in Chapter 4 we expected that the weak
correlation will be significantly stronger than the strong correlation. This was not the case
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for AS12306. AS12306 showed a strong correlation of 93% and a weak correlation of 96%.
We argue that this is due to the small amount of different target used. As only a fraction
of them differed the small and strong correlation are expected to be quite equal.
Time to change. The time of change differed significantly between AS680 and AS12306
and between the two measurement periods. Whereas AS680 showed an average time to
change of 6h for Traceroute and 5.4h for BGP in the first measurement period and 14.84h for
Traceroute and 8.8h for BGP in the second measurement period. AS1230 did not encounter
any BGP changes in the first measurement period and the Traceroute changes were 3h apart
on average for the first measurement period. For the second measurement period AS12306
encountered one target with two changes which were 65h apart and no target with more
than one change in the Traceroute data, thus we were not able to calculate the average time
between changes.
AS12306 used a significantly smaller amount of probes than AS680. This lead to targets
having more than two changes in either BGP or Traceroute to be a rare event. We therefore
argue that the numbers given for AS12306 should not be considered reliable and the AS680
measurements should rather be used.
Reflection of change. The reflection of changes in the other dataset differed greatly
between the two datasets as well as between the measurement periods. In the first mea-
surement period 22% of AS680 and 25% of AS12306 targets reflected Traceroute changes
in BGP measurements at some later point. 43% of all BGP changes were reflected in
Traceroute measurements in AS680. AS12306 experienced no changes in BGP and thus the
reflection could not be calculated. In the second measurement period no target in AS12306
reflected changes for either BGP nor Traceroute. AS680 showed higher values for the re-
flection of BGP changes reflected in Traceroute and a nearly equal value for Traceroute
changes reflected in BGP.
We again argue that the differences between the two ASes can be explained by the sig-
nificant difference in targets. As AS12306 did not show any changes in BGP measurements
in the first measurment period and only one in the second we have to assume that neither
value of reflection is close to the truth. However, due to the higher amount of targets for
AS680 we consider those results to reflect actual behavior. We further argue that the results
of the second period are more precise as the timeframe was significantly longer and thus
changes could more likely be accounted for.
Correlation of length with change. We observed no strong correlation between the
length of a path and the amount of changes it exhibited during our measurement for neither
IP nor ASN paths. We argue that this is due to the fact that IP paths are likely to change
and thus the length does not have such a high impact. However, all AS paths were short
and thus the length did not significantly impact change probabilities. We therefore argue
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that there is no significant correlation between the length of a path and its changes.
Reflect that we admit at multiple points that AS12306 lacked a significant amount of tar-
gets and thus is unlikely to provide exact or reliable results. However, we do consider the
results of AS12306 concerning the strong and weak correlation to a good sanity check for
the results of AS680. Even though AS12306 lacked a high amount of targets, strong and
weak correlation take all measurement points for each target into account and do not rely
on rare route changes, thus there are enough measurement points to consider AS12306 to
be an indication that the AS680 results are not due to some observation bias or routing
exception only exhibited by AS680.
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7 Interpretation
In this chapter we categorize the mismatches according to the different patterns introduced
in Chapter 4 and the observed patterns. Additionally, we explain the limitations of our
approach. We conclude the chapter by arguing that we consider Traceroute to be a valid
tool for path detection.
7.1 Observed Patterns
We explain in Chapter 4 that we expect a mismatch between routes and give multiple
reasons why such mismatches should occur. In this segment we categorize the observed
patterns and mismatches by the previously defined patterns. We conclude by explaining
why we do not account for all patterns.
7.1.1 Route Fluttering
During the first measurement period we observed 4 properly fluttering routes for targets
of AS680. 2 targets experienced patterns which showed clear evidence of fluttering though
none of the main Traceroute paths matched the BGP path. AS12306 contained no fluttering
routes.
During the second measurement period we observed 13 properly fluttering routes for
targets of AS680. 2 targets experienced patterns which indicate fluttering but none of the
main Traceroute paths matched the BGP path. Again AS12306 contained no fluttering
routes.
7.1.2 Short Lived Routing Problems
We observed 11 routes to targets of AS680 experiencing patterns we attribute to Short lived
routing problems during the first measurement period. AS12306 had 0 targets showing such
behavior.
We observed 14 routes to targets of AS680 experiencing patterns we attribute to Short
lived routing problems during the second measurement period. AS12306 had 0 targets
showing such behavior.
7.1.3 Transit AS
We observed patterns indicating transit ASes for 1 target in BGP and 11 targets in Tracer-
oute for AS680 during the first measurement period. In 8 of cases this observation coincided
with a complete mismatch during the whole measurement period. In 3 cases this pattern
only resulted in mismatches when Traceroute switched to that route.
We observed patterns indicating transit ASes for 1 target in BGP and 19 targets in
Traceroute for AS680 during the second measurement period. The BGP transit AS mis-
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Figure 9: A graph showing route fluttering over the course of the measurements.
Figure 10: A graph showing route fluttering. But obviously this does not account for
all mismatches.
matched coincided with a mismatch for the whole measurement timeframe. In 7 of cases
the transit observation in Traceroute coincided with a complete mismatch during the whole
measurement period. In 12 cases this pattern only resulted in mismatches when Traceroute
switched to that route. AS12306 did not contain any targets containing transits.
7.1.4 Remaining Uncategorized Patterns
In the previous sections we categorized the observed patterns and mismatches into the
scenarios described in Chapter 4. In the first measurement period we accounted for 24 of
all 44 mismatches in AS680. For the second measurement period we account for 29 of 46
mismatches in AS680. AS12306 encountered fewer patterns and we accounted for 0 of 1
mismatches in the first and 0 of 3 mismatches in the second measurement period.
We were not able to account for all mismatches. However, we argue that this number
can be further reduced as soon as a distinction between transit ASes and IXPs can be
made. Some of the mismatches showed a constant single step mismatch and thus can either
be attribute to IXPs or transit ASes in-between different peers. We further encountered
multiple targets showing patterns that do not fit a distinct category and thus can not be
properly categorized. We argue that this is due to either a combination of multiple scenarios
or a yet unknown new distinct routing phenomenon. We suspend categorizing the remaining
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mismatches for future work that includes a greater measurement basis.
We conclude that all our predicted patterns occur. However, we are not able to account
for all patterns and thus lack a complete framework of patterns to fully explain current
routing behavior.
7.2 Limitations of Our Approach
Our evaluation has clear limitations and this thesis should therefore be considered a step
towards a consensus rather than a final conclusion on the topic.
The most significant issue is the limited vantage points. This is due to a low availability
of public traceroute servers hosted in ASes which also provide their BGP data. It would
be possible to improve on this issue by collaborating with different providers. As route
prediction is also of great interest to an AS owner a collaboration in which a traceroute
probe is hosted in an AS as well as the AS owner peering with a collector provided by the
researchers seems realistic. We assume that the main reasons why AS owner do not already
peer with public collectors are that such projects are not well known outside the research
community, to set up a peering is not worth the time for a AS owner, the owner considers
its routing data proprietary and does not want to share with the open public. Stipulating
a direct collaboration would lessen or negate such reasons.
The next significant problem is the small amount targets used for different traceroute
measurements. Even though the targets were diversified to ensure that different ASes are
targeted and therefore redundancies in paths and their influence on the results is minimized
only an insignificant amount of the current Internet network of ASes was targeted. We used
a public list of tor nodes to ensure availability of the targeted IPs, thus to ensure that a
traceroute reaches the targeted AS and the targeted server. Even though this approach is
intuitive and simple to implement an organized mapping of available servers throughout the
Internet seems feasible in a reasonable amount of time and reasonable resources, at least
for IPv4. We considered such approach to be out of scope, and focused on a general tool
chain for easy comparison of traceroute and BGP data.
A third issue is the data we used. We did not perform a quality assessment of the data
and thus cannot ensure that the data we gathered does not contain a bias which carries over
into our results. We consider the risk of a bias to be present as the BGP data collected was
gathered from public projects who only collect data from volunteers. Any AS that is not
honest with its BGP messages would not peer with such a project as it would significantly
increase the risk of being discovered. Our most important placement resided in the Deutsche
Forschungs Netzwerk (DFN). The DFN cannot not be considered representative for commer-
cial BGP usage as it is a non profit organization. The second significantly smaller placement
was selected from a public list of servers offering Traceroute interfaces. The chosen interface
was hosted by a renown German IT-newsite (www.heise.de/netze/tools/traceroute/). As
we expect the hoster of the Traceroute to only have a client customer relationship with the
provider of the BGP data we consider the risk of a bias to be smaller.
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We consider the timeframe of the measurements to be a remaining smaller issue. Our
measurements spanned less than a month and one could argue that our time frame is too
limited to ensure that the observed patterns are representative. A measurement period
of multiple month or years would yield more scientifically sound results. Due to the time
required we also considered this to be out of scope for this thesis.
7.3 BGP or Traceroute
We reason by our results that Traceroute should be considered a double-edged sword. It is
apparent hat traceroute can show path steps which are either invisible to BGP or simply not
in the BGP configuration. We consider this to be path depended as we also have results in
which BGP showed additional ASes which were not detected using traceroute. We attribute
this to the nature of interconnected machines: Different starts can lead to different paths
even if the start resides int the same AS. In our case this means that if a border router was
placed differently than the one the Traceroute detection passed a constant mismatch is the
result.
We conclude that Traceroute is a valid tool for path prediction for a specific machine.
We question the usage of Traceroute as a general means of network topology discovery if
measurement positions are abstracted away. This is not to be considered different for BGP.
However, we consider Traceroute to be a good tool to establish an overview of all likely
paths used if measurements are performed multiple times. We advise against using single
measurements as this would lead to missing routes in case of route fluttering which is a
common pattern in modern routing behavior. Additionally we want to stress that our con-
clusion only holds for detection of connection participants not actively evading Traceroute
detection as explained in chapter 3.2.
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis we presented a tool chain for comparing BGP and Traceroute predicted AS
paths. We used the tool chain in a limited study and presented the results.
We showed that the majority of paths in the Internet appear to be stable and match
precisely the paths predicted by BGP. We also presented a small but significant amount
of measurements where the matching assumption does not hold. However, we are able to
explain roughly half of the mismatches. Additionally, most of the mismatches imply that
BGP is too static for path prediction, as route fluttering and short time routing problems
are behaviors BGP is unable to account for. Furthermore, we argue that the usage of transit
ASes is location specific, thus a mismatch due to this reason is specific to the start location
of a connection.
We conclude that there is good evidence that Traceroute is a valid tool for path pre-
diction for a specific machine if multiple measurements are performed and the results are
only applied for a limited time period. It is necessary to repeat path measurements reg-
ularly to account for changes in the routing behavior. We restrict this conclusion to the
detection of connection participants to participants not actively avoiding detection, as it is
possible to evade Traceroute detection without Traceroute recognizing the missing hops in
a connection.
8.1 Future Work
We have convincing results concerning BGP and Traceroute path correlation, but we are
aware that a strong correlation between Traceroute and BGP does not necessarily mean
that either bears any resemblance towards the real routing of traffic, as they are either trust
based (BGP) or exploit a feature of a protocol that was never meant for that pupose. They
only present a best effort approach based on current knowledge. We consider any deepening
research into routing and Traceroute interesting.
A long time study combined with a collaboration with different ASes could overcome the
limitations we discussed in Chapter 7 and would be an important addition to the research
already performed. It could further validate the results already established or present a
complete novel view on the routing in the Internet. More over, it would reliable quantify
the occurrences of the phenomenons theorized in Chapter 4.
As another opportunity for future research, we consider to validate whether Traceroute
reflects the paths taken by actual user traffic, e.g. FTP or HTTP. Additionally, it is
interesting to validate whether Traceroute-detected paths are a good match for all types of
traffic or whether load heavy or constant connections are rerouted outside the scope of the
Traceroute detection mechanism. There has already been work on traffic types and their
treatment [4] [31] [30]. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no work comparing
Traceroute path results with actual paths of different traffic types.
Finally, we would also like to explore whether route fluttering can be linked to the
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size of a AS. We expect that the size of an AS has a great influence of the amount of
border routers and load balancing and thus leads to more a more likely observation of route
fluttering. Another assumption we would like to explore and that is linked to the size of
an AS, is the amount of different routes leading to the same target. We suspect that this
number is also dependent on the size of the AS. Big ASes are more likely to be spaced over
a vast geographical area and thus will more likely exhibit transit ASes and different border
routers depending on where the measurement was started, either inside or outside the AS.
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